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The Eﬀects of Environmental
Policy on the Performance
of Environmental Research
Joint Ventures
Yannis Katsoulacos, Alistair Ulph, and David Ulph
Over the last 10 years, a signiﬁcant literature has developed on the eﬀects
of environmental policy on the incentives for ﬁrms to undertake research
and development (R&D) that will lead to the development of new environ-
mentally friendly products and/or processes. In what follows, we refer to
this as environmental R&D.
The starting point of this literature is the recognition that market forces
will produce very weak incentives for ﬁrms to undertake environmental
R&D, and so government incentives are required to correct this market
failure. There have been three main strands in this literature. The ﬁrst1 ex-
amines the eﬀects of environmental policy (e.g., taxes and standards) on
the incentives to undertake R&D. An important point that emerges from
this literature is that while environmental policy does indeed give ﬁrms an
incentive to undertake environmental R&D, a toughening of this policy
will not necessarily increase the amount of R&D. This is because while a
tougher environmental policy will have a direct eﬀect of encouraging more
environmental R&D, it can also have the indirect eﬀect of raising costs
and reducing output, and this will lower R&D incentives. Thus, contrary
to the widely discussed Porter hypothesis, there is no theoretical presump-
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1. See Ulph (1997) for a survey.
309tion that tougher environmental policy will itself be suﬃc i e n tt op r o m o t e
greater R&D incentives.
A second strand2 looks at the combined eﬀects of both technology pol-
icy and environmental policy on the levels of R&D, output, and emissions
in an oligopolistic industry. Thus, in the context of a model where ﬁrms
do only environmental R&D, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) show
that a combined R&D subsidy plus emissions tax can generate the ﬁrst-
best solution. Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (1997) explore the design of
technology policy in the context where governments are constrained in the
use of environmental policy.
The third strand3 considers the setting of environmental policy in a mul-
tinational context, where governments are aware that the levels of environ-
mental policies they set will aﬀect the strategic competition between
ﬁrms—particularly their choices of R&D. The issue here is whether trade
concerns lead governments to set environmental policies that are too lax.
A feature of virtually all4 this literature is that it assumes that ﬁrms
undertake R&D in a noncooperative fashion. However, there are many
potential beneﬁts that are thought to ﬂow from having ﬁrms undertake
R&D cooperatively in a research joint venture (RJV): a reduction in risk,
the achievement of economies of scale and scope, the elimination of waste-
ful duplication, and the greater appropriation of the returns to innovation.
These beneﬁts arise because RJVs are thought to promote greater informa-
tion sharing and coordination of R&D decisions.5
There is now a considerable literature on the performance of RJVs.
However, this literature focuses exclusively on the types of product and
process R&D that ﬁrms undertake for conventional commercial beneﬁt
and, as such, ignores environmental innovation, which, as we have pointed
out, is primarily undertaken in response to environmental policies.6 Conse-
quently, in this paper we wish to understand how environmental policy
aﬀects environmental innovation when we allow for the possibility that
this innovation is undertaken cooperatively through the formation of what
2. See, e.g., Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) and Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky
(1997).
3. See e.g. A. Ulph (1996a, 1996b), Ulph and Ulph (1996), and D. Ulph (1994).
4. The exception is Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (1997). However, although they allow
for R&D cooperation, they assume that governments are unable to implement environmental
policies such as pollution taxes. Thus they are unable to address the central issue of this
paper—the eﬀects of environmental policies on RJV performance.
5. Of course, concern is also sometimes expressed that RJVs may use the ability to cooper-
ate on R&D decisions to promote anticompetitive practices in the output market. Neverthe-
less, RJVs are widely thought to be beneﬁcial on balance, and many governments promote
their formation through reducing the ventures’ antitrust liabilities, and, sometimes, by subsi-
dizing R&D undertaken through an RJV. For an account of recent work on this topic, see,
e.g., Poyago-Theotoky (1997) for a collection of recent papers.
6. These may be actual or anticipated environmental regulatory policies. Scott (1996) re-
ports evidence that RJV formation takes place in response to both actual and anticipated
regulation.
310 Yannis Katsoulacos, Alistair Ulph, and David Ulphwe will call environmental RJVs. In particular, we wish to understand how
environmental policy aﬀects the innovative performance of RJVs as com-
pared to a noncooperative equilibrium.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 10.1, we set out some
background discussion on the current understanding of RJV performance
and sketch out the issues that need to be addressed in thinking about the
interaction between environmental policy and the performance of environ-
mental RJVs. In section 10.2 we set out a formal model that captures these
issues. Section 10.3 uses the model to provide an analysis of the links be-
tween environmental policy and the performance of RJVs. Section 10.4
concludes.
Before we proceed, it is important to point out that in this paper we
focus on the case where the central rationale for RJVs is the avoidance of
duplication in R&D. This is captured by the assumption that the nature
of research discoveries made by ﬁrms is duplicative. We fully recognize
that an important alternative motivation of RJVs is to exploit complemen-
tarities, and in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a) we provide a positive anal-
ysis of this case. However, a full welfare analysis of this case would require
a separate paper.
10.1 Preliminaries
In thinking about the interaction between environmental policy and the
performance of environmental RJVs, it is important to recognize that there
are a number of market failures in operation. One type of failure is product
market failures. Taking as given the number of ﬁrms, the products they
produce, and the technology7 they employ, there are two market failures
that can arise in relation to ﬁrms’ output decisions. The ﬁrst is the conven-
tional pollution externality, which typically leads ﬁrms to overproduce.
The second is imperfect competition arising from the oligopolistic nature
of markets. This, in turn, may be attributable to entry barriers—in particu-
lar the scale economies generated by R&D. Imperfect competition typi-
cally leads to ﬁrms producing too little output. It is well known that in
principle an emissions tax can be chosen to obtain the ﬁrst-best level of
output. Notice that the tax that achieves this ﬁrst-best will depend on the
technologies employed by the ﬁrms.
Another type of failure is innovation market failure. To facilitate discus-
sion, here and throughout the rest of the paper we assume that (1) there
are only two ﬁrms; (2) the products that ﬁrms produce are perfect substi-
tutes; and (3) the research paths that ﬁrms are pursuing are perfect substi-
tutes (or, more accurately, perfect duplicates) in the sense that if both ﬁrms
make a discovery, they have discovered exactly the same thing and so can-
7. In particular, emissions technology.
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in most of the RJV literature, but are by no means innocuous. The third
captures one of the possible reasons why an RJV forms—to avoid duplica-
tion. However, it ignores another potential gain from RJV formation—
exploiting research complementarities. We fully recognize the importance
of this motive, and have recognized it in the positive analysis contained in
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a). However, a full treatment of this case in
the context of the welfare analysis we conduct here would warrant an-
other paper.
It is well known in the industrial organization literature that there are
signiﬁcant market failures in the innovation process. These stem primarily
from the public-good nature of knowledge, as something that is costly to
produce, but virtually costless to reproduce. As is well known, this implies
that the optimum allocation of resources involves having R&D undertaken
in a relatively small number of labs, with the results being sold to others
at a price equal to the value that society places on this knowledge. In this
idealized market system, ﬁrms undertaking any R&D would perceive a
return equal to the value that the entire industry places on it.
However, in the absence of any policy intervention, actual market mech-
anisms will not produce such an outcome. In particular, free riding on
discoveries would so lower the rate of return to R&D that very little R&D
would be undertaken. In the face of this market failure, virtually all gov-
ernments institute a system of protection of intellectual property rights, of
which the patent system is the major part.
While patents provide some correction of the fundamental market fail-
ures, they involve their own distortions, essentially because they reward
ﬁrms for discovering information, but not for sharing it. To see what mar-
ket failures still exist under a patent system, suppose for the moment that
patents are fully eﬀective (i.e., there are no involuntary information leak-
ages) and that there are no mechanisms for sharing information.
To fully understand the nature of market failures, it is useful to follow
Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998) and distinguish three stages in innovation de-
cisions: (1) research design, in the case considered here, amounts to choos-
ing the number of labs to operate; (2) R&D involves choosing the amount
of R&D to do in each lab; and (3) information sharing entails choosing
the amount of information to share with the other lab if a lab makes a
discovery.
We then know that when ﬁrms act noncooperatively their decisions are
subject to the following potential market failures.8 Working backward: At
the information sharing stage, ﬁrms will fail to share information when it
is always socially desirable to do so. At the R&D stage there are three
8. The discussion that follows is based heavily on the analysis in Ulph and Katsoulacos
(1998).
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on proﬁts rather than total surplus (proﬁts plus consumer surplus), and so
do too little R&D; (2) the self-centeredness eﬀect, i nw h i c hﬁ r m sb a s ed e c i -
sions on the gains to themselves from having a new technology rather than
the gain to the industry if everyone had the new technology, again resulting
in too little R&D; and (3) the “competition to be ﬁrst” eﬀect, in which ﬁrms
have incentives to try to be the ﬁrst to introduce a new technology, leading
to their overinvesting in R&D. At the research design stage, there may be
excessive duplication because each ﬁrm will operate its own lab when it
may be socially optimal to operate a single lab.
Suppose now that patents are not completely eﬀective, and there are
involuntary unpaid information leakages—spillovers. This will mitigate
some of the welfare losses at the information sharing stage, but will intro-
duce a fourth distortion at the R&D stage because ﬁrms acting indepen-
dently will not internalize the externality arising from the spillover. We call
this the spillover eﬀect. It introduces a third reason why ﬁrms will under-
invest in R&D.
Notice that it is not at all clear whether, on balance, ﬁrms are doing too
little or too much R&D, either individually or collectively. What is clear is
that a major reason why these market failures arise is that, by themselves,
patents do not reward ﬁrms for sharing information. To resolve these dif-
ﬁculties, it is therefore necessary to introduce mechanisms that reward
ﬁrms for sharing information. Two widely discussed methods of doing this
are through licensing and through the creation of RJVs.
While licensing is certainly used in certain contexts, it is not a general
solution to all these problems. In the ﬁrst place, while it will often solve
the information sharing problem that arises in the ﬁnal stage of the
decision-making process, it will not always do so. This is because even
when there are only two ﬁrms—a buyer and a seller—a license will only
be sold if the maximum amount the buyer is willing to pay exceeds the
minimum amount the seller needs to receive, and this need not always be
the case. More seriously, licensing will not solve the problems arising in
the ﬁrst two stages of innovation decision making. In particular, it does
not eradicate the competition-to-be-ﬁrst eﬀect because, instead of compet-
ing to be the ﬁrst to get exclusive use of a new technology, ﬁrms compete
to be the ﬁrst to be able to license it.
Given these problems with licensing, attention has focused recently on
RJVs as a possible solution to these market failures. RJVs are arrange-
ments under which ﬁrms are allowed to act cooperatively during all three
stages of the innovation decision-making process, but are required to com-
pete in the product market. Prima facie it would seem that, by making
cooperative decisions about all aspects of innovation, RJVs could mitigate
most of the market failures discussed here. By acting cooperatively, ﬁrms
may be induced to share information and so mitigate the market failure at
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joint proﬁts ﬁrms would internalize any spillovers, eliminate the competi-
tion-to-be-ﬁrst eﬀect, and remove the self-centeredness eﬀect at the R&D
stage. Finally, cooperative decision making means that ﬁrms may choose
to operate a single lab rather than two independent labs, at the research
design stage. These informal arguments suggest that the only market fail-
ure that RJVs may not potentially overcome is the undervaluation eﬀect.
Given these potential beneﬁts, it is not surprising that RJVs have re-
ceived considerable attention. However, when one examines the theoretical
literature on the subject, it turns out that, while it has provided some useful
insights, nevertheless there are a number of weaknesses in the way it typi-
cally models RJVs and consequently the analysis fails to fully address
many of these failure issues.9 The major weaknesses of this literature are
as follows.
First, spillovers are treated as exogenous. Either spillovers are the same
in the cooperative equilibrium and the noncooperative equilibrium or else
it is assumed that they are greater in the cooperative equilibrium. In nei-
ther case does the theory explain how cooperation might lead to greater
information sharing.
Second, research discoveries by ﬁrms are assumed to be perfect comple-
ments. In both the cooperative and the noncooperative equilibria, it is as-
sumed that information gained from other ﬁrms just adds to the progress
that a ﬁrm makes on its own. This ignores the possibility of needless dupli-
cation of research and also that one of the beneﬁts of an RJV is that it
increases the degree of complementarity.
Third, a related problem is that equilibria are assumed to be symmetri-
cal. In particular, in both the cooperative and the noncooperative equilib-
ria, all ﬁrms are active in R&D and all do the same amount of R&D. This
ignores the possible cost savings by concentrating R&D in a smaller num-
b e ro fl a b s .
Fourth, the noncooperative equilibrium is taken to be one in which no
licensing is possible. Since many of the models assume that there are just
two ﬁrms, it would seem sensible to allow the possibility of licensing, par-
ticularly if one wants to understand the full beneﬁts of cooperation versus
noncooperation.
To get a sense of just how limiting these assumptions are, it is worth
noting the following result by Hinloopen (1997).
Result 1. Suppose we have an industry comprising n identical ﬁrms. In
addition, suppose R&D spillovers are the same in both the cooperative and
9. Of course, not every paper suﬀers from every one of the weaknesses we identify. How-
ever, most of them arise in the paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), which has
become a classic reference in the literature.
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ernment is an R&D subsidy, R&D discoveries are perfect complements in
both the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria, both the cooperative and
the noncooperative equilibria are symmetrical; and the R&D subsidy can be
ﬁnanced by nondistortionary taxation. Then the cooperative and noncoopera-
tive R&D equilibria achieve exactly the same level of welfare.
Proof. The proof is simple. Given the assumptions, eﬀectively the only
variable that can be chosen by both ﬁrms and the social planner is the
amount of R&D per ﬁrm. Work out the second-best10 o p t i m u ml e v e lo f
R&D. R&D per ﬁrm will be monotonically increasing in the level of sub-
sidy in both the cooperative and the noncooperative equilibria. So,
whetherﬁrmsactcooperativelyornoncooperativelythesubsidycanalways
be chosen to make these equilibria coincide with the second-best optimum.
The conclusion, then, is that as long as governments can subsidize R&D
(which typically they do), then the promotion of RJVs is irrelevant. But
this just emphasizes the point that the underlying model fails to capture
virtually all of the factors that make RJVs interesting in the ﬁrst place.
There is an immediate corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose now that there are environmental externalities;
that ﬁrms undertake environmental R&D that lowers emissions per unit of
output; and that, in addition to the R&D subsidy, the government can also
impose an emissions tax. Suppose also that all the other assumptions of re-
sult 1 hold. Then, once again, the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria
achieve exactly the same level of welfare.
Proof. The fact that the government has an emissions tax means that it
can now control output and so can now achieve the ﬁrst-best level. So
choose output per ﬁrm and R&D per ﬁrm so as to achieve the ﬁrst-best.
Then, whether ﬁrms act cooperatively or noncooperatively, choose the tax
rate and R&D subsidy per ﬁrm so as to achieve the ﬁrst-best.
This corollary allows us to immediately generalize from the case of the
noncooperative equilibrium analyzed in Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas
(1996) to that of a cooperative equilibrium. This shows that in order to
have an interesting theory of the interaction between environmental poli-
cies and RJV performance, one needs a more interesting model of R&D—
one that gives scope for RJVs to achieve some of the objectives they are
supposed to achieve. Recent papers by Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a,
1998b) have gone some way toward correcting the weaknesses of the ex-
10. If governments have no output instrument, then we are conﬁned to second-best op-
tima.
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form. Their models have the following features.
1. Information sharing is endogenous in both the cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria. In particular, the possibility of licensing is allowed
in the noncooperative equilibrium.
2. They allow for the possibility of both complementarity and substitut-
ability between research discoveries.
3. They determine the number of research labs that will be active in the
cooperative equilibrium.11
For the case where there are just two ﬁrms, they obtain the following re-
sults.12 First, ﬁrms may not share information within an RJV. When RJVs
withhold information they do so for anticompetitive reasons. For example,
this will happen whenever industry proﬁts are higher and one ﬁrm has
lower costs than the other and can exploit this to exercise some degree of
monopoly power. However, the conditions under which information is
shared in an RJV are exactly the same as those under which it is licensed
in a noncooperative equilibrium. Hence, in this two-ﬁrm setting, RJVs
perform no better or worse than the noncooperative equilibrium at the
information sharing stage of innovation decisions. Second, RJVs may close
a lab, but may do so for two reasons: to eliminate needless duplication
and to avoid competition that arises when both ﬁrms discover the new
technology. Third, while RJVs may give rise to a higher level of welfare
than in the noncooperative equilibrium, there is a range of circumstances
under which they do not.
In this paper we wish to explore the interaction between environmen-
tal policy and the performance of environmental RJVs within the frame-
work for analyzing RJV performance proposed by Ulph and Katsoulacos
(1998). To understand some of the issues involved in undertaking this exer-
cise, we brieﬂy set out the main features of a very simple version of the
Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998) model adapted to the case of environmen-
tal innovation.
There are two ﬁrms producing a homogeneous product. Initially both
ﬁrms use a technology whereby emissions per unit of output are e  0.
Firms undertake R&D in order to discover a new technology for which
emissions per unit of output are e,0
 e 
 e. Each ﬁrm’s probability of
11. Each ﬁrm operates its own lab in the noncooperative equilibrium.
12. While these papers do not allow for the possibility of an R&D subsidy, it is clear that
in this framework such a subsidy will not, in general, enable governments to achieve a
second-best outcome under either cooperation or noncooperation. This is particularly true
when the social optimum involves closing a lab. An R&D subsidy may encourage an RJV to
keep a lab open that it would otherwise have closed. Thus, the Hinloopen result will not
generalize to this case.
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are independent. There are three possible outcomes of the R&D process:
(1) neither ﬁrm discovers the new technology; (2) both ﬁrms discover the
new technology, but, since they have discovered the same thing, there is
nothing to be gained from sharing the information;13 and one ﬁrm alone
discovers the new technology, in which case a decision has to be made
whether to reveal the new technology to the ﬁrm that has not discovered it.
Assume for the moment that the only policy instruments open to the
government are an emissions tax and the decision whether to allow ﬁrms
to form RJVs. As in all the literature on RJVs, we assume that if ﬁrms are
allowed to cooperate on decisions relating to innovation, they are forced
to compete in the output market.
In modeling the impact of the emissions tax on the performance of
RJVs, an important issue arises as to when in the decision-making process
this decision is made. Notice that, leaving aside the tax-setting decision,
the decisions made by ﬁrms and the government constitute a six-stage
game.
1. RJV policy: The government decides whether or not to allow RJVs.
2. RJV formation: If RJVs are allowed, ﬁrms choose whether or not to
form one.
3. Research design: Firms choose the number of labs to operate.
4. R&D: Firms choose the amount of R&D to do in each lab.
5. Information sharing: Depending on the outcome of the R&D deci-
sions, ﬁrms choose whether or not to share information.
6. Output: Firms choose output in a noncooperative Cournot equi-
librium.
To understand the impact of the environmental policy instrument (emis-
sions tax), notice that there are many diﬀerent assumptions one can make
about when this instrument gets chosen and the information available to
the government when the decision is made. This timing issue reﬂects the
ability of the government to commit itself to the decision. To illustrate this
point, consider two possible assumptions that we could make.
Assumption 1: Government Is Unable to Commit. Here the government sets
the tax rate at the start of stage 6, after it has learned what technology
each of the two ﬁrms is operating, but before ﬁrms have chosen output.
The tax will be set to maximize welfare, conditional on the technologies
employed by the two ﬁrms. This setup corresponds to the conventional
13. This reﬂects the assumption mentioned before that research discoveries are perfect
substitutes. This is the opposite end of the continuum from most of the literature on RJVs,
which focuses on the case of complementary research discoveries.
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that eﬀectively the government sets three tax rates, t11, t10,a n dt00, de-
pending on whether both ﬁrms have the new technology, only one ﬁrm has
the new technology, or neither ﬁrm has the new technology, respectively.
The tax rate chosen by the government in each of these three states will
involve balancing the two product-market failures already discussed.
Thus, the government wants high taxes to discourage emissions, but low
taxes to promote competition. Notice that since all the R&D and informa-
tion-sharing decisions have already been made, the taxes chosen at this
stage will be exactly the same whether or not ﬁrms have cooperated. So
the taxes are conditioned only on technology, not on the previously made
decision about whether or not to cooperate. Let t ˆ11, t ˆ10,a n dt ˆ00 be the opti-
mum taxes set under this assumption.
Assumption 2: Government Has Some Ability to Commit. Here we could
think of the tax being set at the start of stage 5, after ﬁrms have chosen
R&D and after the outcome of the R&D race is known, but before the
information-sharing decision is made. Notice that what the government
announces are the taxes that it will set in stage 6 conditional on the tech-
nologies that each ﬁrm will have at that stage (i.e., conditional on the infor-
mation-sharing decision that is about to be made at stage 5). Now there
are three possible situations the government can be in at the start of stage
5: (1) If both ﬁrms have discovered the new technology, the only possible
state that can arise at the start of stage 6 is state 11, and since there is no
information-sharing decision to be made, it will simply announce t ˆ11. (2) If
neither ﬁrm has discovered the new technology, by analogous reasoning
the government will announce t ˆ00. (3) If one ﬁrm has discovered the new
technology and the other ﬁrm has not, the economy will be in either state
11 or state 10 at the start of stage 6, but now the choice of tax rates in
these two states can inﬂuence the information-sharing decision and obvi-
ously the optimal thing for the government to do is to announce a tax t ˜10
that is so high that the ﬁrms will choose to fully share information. Thus,
by being able to fully commit itself at the information sharing stage in
the process, the government can induce the ﬁrst-best level of information
sharing in both the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria.
We could think of taxes being set at yet earlier stages in the decision-
making process, and, in general, the taxes that are set will depend on the
precise stage at which the decision is made. Rather than conduct an ex-
haustive analysis of all possible situations, we will conﬁne our attention
to the case where the government is unable to commit and explore the
implications of this assumption for the desirability of permitting RJVs. We
will contrast our conclusions with those obtained by Ulph and Katsou-
lacos (1998) for the case of nonenvironmental R&D.
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First, once we take account of the decision about environmental tax rates,
we now eﬀectively have the following seven-stage game:
1. RJV policy: The government decides whether or not to allow RJVs.
2. RJV formation: If RJVs are allowed, ﬁrms choose whether or not to
form one.
3. Research design: Firms choose the number of labs to operate.
4. R&D: Firms choose the amount of R&D to do in each lab.
5. Information sharing: Depending on the outcome of the R&D deci-
sions, ﬁrms choose whether or not to share information.
6. Emissions tax: The government sets environmental taxes t11, t10,o r
t00, conditioning on the technology that each ﬁrm has as a result of the
outcomes of stages 4 and 5.
7. Output: Firms choose output in a noncooperative Cournot equi-
librium.
Second, given the stage at which they are set, the environmental taxes
chosen by the government will be exactly the same irrespective of whether
ﬁrms have made their decisions at stages 3, 4, and 5 in a cooperative or
noncooperative fashion. It therefore follows that, if they are allowed to do
so, ﬁrms will indeed choose to form an RJV at stage 2.
In section 10.2 we explore what decision the government should make
at stage 1. From the discussion thus far it follows that this just reduces to
the question of whether expected social welfare is greater if the decisions
made at stages 3, 4, and 5 are made cooperatively or noncooperatively. It
is important to appreciate that the issues arising in this comparison of the
cooperative and noncooperative equilibria are exactly the same as in Ulph
and Katsoulacos (1998). The crucial point is that the decisions made at
stages 6 and 7 are very diﬀerent, and the question is therefore how these
diﬀerences aﬀect our assessment of the balance of factors at stages 3, 4,
and 5. There are three key diﬀerences: (1) The government has an instru-
ment that can inﬂuence output decisions. (2) The presence of environmen-
tal damage means that there are two wedges between the proﬁts that ﬁrms
use to guide their decisions and the social welfare calculations that the
government will use (consumer surplus and environmental damage). This
will inﬂuence the magnitude of the undervaluation eﬀect. (3) Since the tax
rate will depend on decisions about information sharing, the relationship
between proﬁts and surplus will vary across states in a complex way. Taken
together, these three factors will aﬀect whether the cooperative or the non-
cooperative equilibrium comes closer to achieving the socially optimal in-
novation decisions.
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Consider a closed economy in which there are just two goods: a “dirty”
good whose production causes emissions of some pollutant and expendi-
ture on all other goods. Let X denote aggregate consumption and produc-
tion of the dirty good and Z the aggregate expenditure on all other goods.
There is a single consumer with utility function
uXZ a X X Z (,) . ≡− ⋅ + 1
2
2
There are two ﬁrms producing X. Denote the output of ﬁrm i by xi  0,
i  1, 2, so X  x1  x2. There is a perfectly competitive sector producing
Z under constant returns to scale. Z is numeraire.
There are two possible technologies for producing X: an old (i.e., ex-
isting) technology and a new one that has yet to be discovered. For each
technology, unit costs of production are c,0
 c 
 a. Emissions per unit
of output with the new technology are e  1, and with the old technology
e  1   ,0
 
1. Thus technologies diﬀer only in their environmental
attributes; that is, we are dealing with purely environmental innovation.
The parameter   provides a measure of how much better the new technol-
ogy is compared to the old one in terms of its emissions properties.
If ﬁrm i produces output xi using a technology that generates emissions
per unit of output ei  {1, 1   }, then the total emissions, E, produced
by the two ﬁrms are E  x1 
 e1  x2 
 e2. We assume that the damage done
by these emissions is given by the function D(E)  (d/2) 
 E2.
In order to discover the new technology with lower emissions levels,
ﬁrms undertake R&D. If the two ﬁrms act noncooperatively, they each
operate their own independent lab. If they form an RJV, then at stage 3
they can choose either to continue to operate one lab each or to operate a
single combined lab.
In stage 4, ﬁrms choose the amount of R&D to do in each lab. The
amount of R&D a lab does determines the probability that it will discover
the new technology. If both ﬁrms undertake R&D, then each has an inde-
pendent probability of discovery that depends solely on the amount of
R&D that it itself undertakes. Thus, as in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a),
there are no R&D input spillovers, only R&D output spillovers.
As in Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998), we assume that the R&D expendi-
ture that a lab needs to undertake in order to get a probability of discovery
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The parameter  reﬂects the extent of decreasing returns to R&D in each
lab. As discussed in Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998), this is an important
determinant of whether RJVs will choose to operate one or two labs.
In stage 5, decisions are made about sharing the information resulting
from the discoveries made in stage 4. There are three possible outcomes
of stage 4. First, neither ﬁrm discovers the new technology. Since no infor-
mation has been discovered, there is no information to be shared, and so
both ﬁrms continue to operate with a technology in which emissions per
unit of output are e  1   . Second, both ﬁrms discover the new technol-
ogy. We assume that in this case, while each ﬁrm has obtained some infor-
mation, it is exactly the same information, and so there is absolutely noth-
ing to be gained by sharing it.15 The reason for making this assumption is
that, as we see later, it introduces the possibility of needless duplication
of research eﬀort—one of the market failures that RJVs are supposed to
alleviate. Thus, in this case each ﬁrm now operates with a technology in
which emissions per unit of output are e  1. Third, one ﬁrm alone dis-
covers the new technology. The ﬁrm that has discovered the new technol-
ogy will now have emissions per unit of output of e  1. Now there is
some information to be shared, and something to be gained (at least by
the recipient) from sharing it. We assume that there are just two possible
decisions to be made about information sharing:16 either no information is
shared, in which case the emissions per unit of output of the ﬁrm that has
not discovered the technology will be e  1   ,17 or full information
sharing takes place, in which case the emissions per unit of output of the
ﬁrm that has not discovered the technology will be e  1.18
Notice now that if one ﬁrm alone discovers the new technology, and if
15. In the terminology used by Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a), the research discoveries
are perfect substitutes.
16. We show in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a) that there is no loss of generality in reducing
the options to just two.
17. This ignores the possibility that there may be some involuntary information leakage





18. This ignores the possibility that the ﬁrm that has not discovered the technology may
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be precisely the same as if both ﬁrms had discovered the technology—
each ﬁrm will have emissions e  1. Thus there is nothing to be gained by
having both ﬁrms discover the new technology that could not be gained
by having just one ﬁrm discover the new technology and sharing the re-
sults. In this sense, there has clearly been a duplication of research eﬀort.
In stage 6, the government sets the environmental tax rate. There are
three possible situations that can occur at the start of stage 6, depending
on which technology each ﬁrm has. First, neither ﬁrm has the new technol-
ogy. This situation can arise only if neither ﬁrm discovers the new technol-
ogy. Variables relating to this situation are described by a superscript 00.
Second, both ﬁrms have the new technology. This situation can arise if
either both ﬁrms discover the new technology or if only one does and
information is fully shared. Variables relating to this situation are de-
scribed by the superscript 11. Third, only one ﬁrm has the new technology.
This situation can arise only if just one ﬁrm discovers the new situation
and information is not shared. Aggregate variables relating to this situa-
tion are described by the superscript 10. Variables relating to individual
ﬁrms will carry the superscript 10 for the ﬁrm that has the new technology
and 01 for the ﬁrm that does not. Thus the government eﬀectively sets
three tax rates: t11, t10,a n dt00.
Finally, in stage 7 output decisions are made conditional on the marginal
costs that each ﬁrm will have as a result of the decisions made in the
previous three stages. We assume that collusion over output is forbidden.
Consequently, the output of the two ﬁrms is determined as a noncoopera-
tive equilibrium. In this paper, we conﬁne attention to the noncooperative
Cournot equilibrium. However, the nature of this equilibrium depends on
the taxes set by the government in stage 6.
10.3 The Solution and the Welfare Measures
As is conventional we solve the model backward.
10.3.1 Stage 7: The Cournot Equilibrium
If ﬁrm i has technology ei  {1, 1   }, and if the government has
imposed an emissions tax t per unit of emissions, then, in an interior Cour-
not equilibrium, the output of ﬁrm i is
(1) x










and the proﬁts it makes are
ii x = () .
2
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Since all the innovation decisions have already been made, all the gov-
ernment can inﬂuence at this stage is the output equilibrium in stage 7.
All that matters to the government, then, is the ﬂow of welfare, comprising
consumer surplus, producer surplus (proﬁts), and environmental damage.
If ﬁrm i produces output xi using a technology that generates emissions
per unit of output ei  {1, 1   }, then the total emissions, E, produced
by the two ﬁrms are E  x1 
 e1  x2 
 e2. As noted before, we assume that
the damage done by these emissions is given by the function D(E)  (d/2)

 E 2. The ﬂow of social welfare in this output market situation is, therefore,
(2) Wxx ee a c x x x x
d xe xe
(,;,) ( ) ( ) ( )
() .
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By substituting the equilibrium outputs in equation (1) into the social wel-
fare function (2), we can determine social welfare as a function of the tax
rate alone. Consequently, we can determine the optimum tax rate and the
equilibrium to which it gives rise.
To understand this more fully, it is useful to consider in turn two sepa-
rate cases. In case 1, both ﬁrms have the same emissions per unit of output,
e  {1, 1   }. Notice that in this case both ﬁrms will choose identical
output, and so it follows from equation (1) that welfare depends solely on
the aggregate level of output, X.T h u sw ec a nw r i t e




From equation (2) we know that equilibrium aggregate output is
(4) Xa c t e =⋅−− ⋅ 2
3
() ,
so it now follows that, by suitable choice of t, the government can achieve
the ﬁrst-best level of welfare.
From equation (3) it follows that the ﬁrst-best level of aggregate out-
put is





Combining equations (3) and (4), we see that the tax rate that achieves the
optimum is
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It is straightforward to check that welfare in the social optimum is








and industry proﬁts in the social optimum are



















This shows that industry proﬁts understate social welfare and that the gap
is larger when both ﬁrms have the old technology than when they both
have the new technology.
To ease notation later on, let t11, W11, 11 (t00, W00, 00) denote the opti-
mal tax rate and the ﬂow levels of welfare and industry proﬁts when both
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In case 2, ﬁrm 1 has the old technology and ﬁrm 2 the new technology.
This case can only arise if one ﬁrm has discovered the new technology, but
does not share the information. Notice ﬁrst of all that, in general, the
government can now no longer obtain the ﬁrst-best output equilibrium.
Since the two ﬁrms have diﬀerent technologies, they will choose diﬀerent
output levels. The ﬁrst-best level would require getting both of these out-
put levels right, and with just a single instrument—the environmental tax
rate—this typically is impossible to achieve. In particular, the ﬁrst-best
level would require that only ﬁrm 2 be active and so act as a monopolist.
For this possibility to arise it would have to be the case that when the
government sets the tax that would be optimal if ﬁrm 2 were a monopolist,
then ﬁrm 1’s costs would be so high that it would not be willing to enter.
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d/(d  1) 
1. Since in this paper we assume that  '1, we can rule this possibility out.
Indeed, throughout the paper we wish to conﬁne our attention to the
case where, in the optimum, both ﬁrms are active. To analyze this situa-
tion, we will begin by assuming that both ﬁrms are active, derive the opti-
mum tax rate under this assumption, and then check that, given this tax
rate, both ﬁrms are indeed active.
In an interior Cournot equilibrium, the individual and aggregate out-
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Social welfare is W  (a  c) 
 X  1⁄2 
 X 2  (d/2) 
 E2, and so the
optimal tax arises where
′ =− − ⋅ ′ −⋅⋅ ′ = Wa c X X d E E [( ) ] . 0
Carrying out the calculation, we ﬁnd that
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Before discussing the properties of the optimum tax, we need to conﬁrm
that this tax rate is consistent with our assumption of an interior Cournot














.     





Environmental Policy and Performance of Environmental RJVs 325It is straightforward to check that d( ) is strictly decreasing in  . For later
purposes, table 10.1 shows the values taken by this function for a range of
values of 0 
 '1. We can also invert d( ) to obtain the function  (d),
w h i c hg i v e s ,f o ra n yd, an upper bound on   for which the optimal tax
yields an interior Cournot equilibrium.
What are the properties of the optimal tax when ﬁrms do not share
information? As noted previously, it is easy to check that t10 is a strictly
increasing function of d. Thus, as we would expect, the more damaging are
emissions, the higher is the optimal tax. The crucial question is how t10
varies with   because later on we will want to know whether the tax rate
is higher if ﬁrms do not share information than if they do share informa-
tion. That is, we will want to know whether t10( , d)  t11. Now it follows
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so what we really want to know is whether t10( , d)  t10(0, d).
To answer this question consider ﬁrst two extreme cases. In one case,
when d  0,

















Thus, as we would expect, when there is no environmental damage the
government imposes a subsidy to correct the loss arising from imperfect
competition. However, because the subsidy is imposed on emissions rather
than on output, the subsidy itself induces what is in this case an unwar-
ranted asymmetry between the two ﬁrms. A larger value of   means the
subsidy has to be smaller (i.e., the negative tax larger) in order to reduce
the unwarranted distortion.
In the second case, when d →∞ ,
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Table 10.1 Computed Values of d
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table 10.1, we have calculated the value of t10 as   ranges over values in
the interval 0 ' ' (d). The results are presented in appendix tables
10A.1–10A.5. These show that when d is small the optimal tax ﬁrst rises
and then falls with  , while when d is large the optimal tax is a strictly
decreasing function of  .
The intuition behind these results is as follows. In setting the tax, the
government is trying to correct two distortions: (1) that caused by imper-
fect competition and (2) that caused by pollution. Consider these in turn.
For the ﬁrst distortion, the larger   is, the lower is aggregate output, and
so the greater the loss arising from imperfect competition. This suggests
that the optimal tax should fall with  . For the second distortion, when d
is small, so too is the optimal tax, and, when    0, an increase in   causes
aggregate emissions to rise—which calls for an increase in the optimal tax
to correct this distortion. On balance, the second factor outweighs the ﬁrst
when    0 causes the optimal tax to rise with  . However, when d is large,
so too is the optimal tax, and it is easy to check that in this case aggregate
emissions are a strictly decreasing function of  , so this second factor also
calls for the optimal tax to fall with  .
Having determined the optimal tax, we can substitute this back into the
expressions for output, proﬁts, and welfare, and so determine aggregate
proﬁts, 10, and aggregate welfare, W10 as functions of the underlying pa-
rameters d and  . These proﬁt and welfare expressions can then be used
to determine the equilibrium and optimum information-sharing and R&D
decisions in stages 2 and 1, respectively. To these we now turn.
10.3.3 Stage 5: The Information-Sharing Decision
Suppose that just one ﬁrm has discovered the new technology. If it does
not share information, then the resulting levels of aggregate welfare and
aggregate proﬁts will be W10 and 10, respectively. If information is shared,
then the resulting levels of aggregate welfare and aggregate proﬁts will be
W11 and 11, respectively.
As discussed in Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998), information sharing will
be socially desirable if and only if W11  W10, and will be privately proﬁt-
able in both the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria (under licens-
ing) if and only if 11  10. Unfortunately, the expressions for aggregate
proﬁts, 10, and aggregate welfare, W10, that emerge from the analysis in
stage 6 are suﬃciently complex that it is extremely diﬃcult to explore these
inequalities analytically, so we have had to explore them numerically. Ap-
pendix tables 10A.1–10A.5 give the computed values for proﬁts and wel-
fare as   ranges over values in the interval 0 ' ' (d). In reading these
tables, it is important to bear in mind that the ﬁrst row, corresponding to
the case  0, corresponds to the situation where both ﬁrms have a tech-
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here are W 11 and 11, respectively.
An inspection of these appendix tables shows that in all cases welfare is
lower when  0 than when  0; that is, W 11  W 10,a n ds o ,a sw e
would expect, full information is socially desirable. This is because, when
information is fully shared, both ﬁrms have the least-polluting technology,
and the government can then use its tax powers to achieve the ﬁrst-best
levels of output.
Let us now consider the private information-sharing decision of the two
ﬁrms. From Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998), we know that ﬁrms will choose
not to share information whenever the ﬁrm with the new technology has
as u ﬃcient cost advantage. This enables it to exercise signiﬁcant market
power, and so the resulting industry proﬁts are higher than would be the
case if both ﬁrms had the new low-cost technology and the industry was
consequently very competitive. The diﬀerence now is that the cost diﬀer-
ence between ﬁrms depends on both the diﬀerence in technology, as re-
ﬂected in the parameter  , and on the tax rates t11, t10.
To understand what is going on here, consider ﬁrst the case where the
government sets some arbitrary tax rate t, which is independent of the
technologies actually used by the two ﬁrms, and thus is the same whether
or not information is shared. Then it follows from the result in Ulph and
Katsoulacos (1998) that information will deﬁnitely be shared if
(6) ta c () , 25 +< −  
and will deﬁnitely not be shared if inequality (6) is reversed. This shows
that the information-sharing condition depends on both the tax rate, t,a n d
on the technology gap parameter,  , and that information is shared when
both t and   are small.
As a variant of this thought experiment, suppose now that instead of
setting an arbitrary tax rate, the government sets the same tax rate t11
whether or not information is shared. Then inequality (6) becomes








In the appendix, we present the values of   ˜(d) corresponding to each of
the values of d in table 10.1. We see that when d  1, then   ˜(1)   (1),
and so, if the government sets the tax rate t11, whether or not the informa-
tion is shared, then, for this value of d information will always be shared—
that is, will be shared for all values of    [0,  (1)]. However, when d  1,
  ˜(d) 
  (d), and so information will not always be shared—that is, will not
be shared for all values of    [0,  (d)]. In particular, information will only
be shared if emissions under the old technology are suﬃciently close to
those with the new technology.
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min{[  ˜(d)]/[ (d)], 1} measure the fraction of the range of feasible values
of   over which information is shared. Then we see from appendix tables
10A.1–10A.5 that  ˜(1)  1, but that  ˜(d) is a strictly decreasing function
of d. In this sense, we conclude that information sharing becomes less
likely the larger the value of d.
These results are in line with the work of Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998).
Information sharing is likely when the cost diﬀerences are small. When the
damage is small, then so too is the optimal tax rate, and so cost diﬀerences
are small for all    [0,  (d)]. However when damage is large, so too is the
tax rate, and so information will only be shared when the underlying tech-
nology gap parameter   is suﬃciently small.
Finally, when we recognize that the government will in fact set a diﬀer-
ent tax rate t10 if information is not shared from the tax rate t11 that will
be set if information is shared, then we need to know whether 11  10.
From the discussion so far we know that 11 is the value of industry proﬁts
when  0. So, in looking at the appendix tables, we can determine
whether or not information is shared in any given situation by simply com-
paring the value of industry proﬁts 10 with that given in the ﬁrst row of
appendix tables 10A.1–10A.5.
We see that when d  1, for all positive values of  ' (1), industry
proﬁts are lower than in the case where  0—that is, information is
always shared. However, when d  1, then, by interpolation, there exists a
  ˘(d), 0 
  ˘(d) 
  (d) such that industry proﬁts are the same when  
  ˘(d) as when  0. This implies that information will be shared when 0 

 
  ˘(d) and will not be shared when   ˘(d) 
 ' (d).
By analogy with what we did before we can let  ˘(d)  min{[  ˘(d)]/
[ (d)], 1} denote the fraction of the range of feasible values of over which
information is shared when the government sets diﬀerent tax rates t11, t10.
From the appendix tables we see that when d is small, then  ˘(d)  ˜(d);
but that when d is large, then  ˘(d) 
 ˜(d). Thus, when the government
sets diﬀerent taxes if ﬁrms share information than if they do not, then,
compared to the situation where the same tax rate is set irrespective of the
information-sharing decision, information sharing becomes more likely
when the damage is small, but less likely when the damage is large. This
latter result follows from the result noted before. When damage is small,
taxes tend to increase with  , which ceteris paribus lowers proﬁts when
information is not shared and so makes information sharing more attrac-
tive than in the case where taxes do not change with  . However, when
damage is large, taxes tend to fall with  , which ceteris paribus raises
proﬁts when information is not shared and so makes information sharing
less attractive than in the case where taxes do not change with  . Having
understood the information-sharing decision we can turn ﬁnally to the
R&D decisions.
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We have to determine the amount of R&D done by each of the two
labs in each of the two equilibria—cooperative and noncooperative. In
particular, in considering the cooperative (RJV) equilibrium we have to
allow for the possibility of an asymmetrical solution in which one of the
labs does no R&D.
Before turning to the more detailed analysis, it is important to make
three general points about the nature of the R&D decisions.
1. As noted in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a) and in Ulph and Katsou-
lacos (1998), although, ex ante, the two ﬁrms are identical, the R&D out-
comes need not be. In particular, in both the social optimum and in the
cooperative equilibrium, it may turn out to be optimal to have only one
ﬁrm undertake R&D. Whether or not this is the case turns on a trade-
oﬀ between diminishing returns and needless duplication. The greater the
extent of diminishing returns (the larger the parameter  in the R&D cost
function) the more likely it is that both labs will be kept open.
2. In the noncooperative equilibrium, both ﬁrms will undertake R&D
(and the equilibrium will be symmetrical). This means that the noncooper-
ative equilibrium may be prone to a welfare loss of needless duplication.
3. When ﬁrms share information in the noncooperative equilibrium,
they do so through licensing. We assume that the license fee is determined
by negotiation, and that the licenser and the licensee have equal bargain-
ing power. So the license fee is just halfway between the maximum price
that the licensee is willing to pay and the minimum price at which the
licenser is willing to sell.
The detailed analysis of the R&D decisions is now very similar to that
given in Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998), so in what follows we just brieﬂy
summarize the main points of their analysis.
Point 1 makes it diﬃcult to undertake any general analysis of the R&D
decisions in the social optimum and in each of the two equilibria. Most of
the analytical conclusions are therefore obtained in the easier case where
both ﬁrms undertake R&D. As noted in our earlier papers, there are then
two incentives driving the R&D decisions—competitive threat19 and
proﬁt incentive.20
Whether or not information is shared, the proﬁt incentive is weakest in
the cooperative equilibrium and strongest in the social optimum, with the
proﬁt incentive in the noncooperative equilibrium lying between the other
two. The proﬁt incentive is strongest in the social optimum because welfare
19. For each ﬁrm, this is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ (in terms of proﬁts
or welfare) if both ﬁrms innovate and the payoﬀ if the other ﬁrm alone innovates.
20. For each ﬁrm, this is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ if the ﬁrm alone
discovers the technology and the payoﬀ if neither discovers it.
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ronmental damage. The proﬁt incentive is greater in the noncooperative
equilibrium than in the cooperative equilibrium, because most of the gains
from having a ﬁrm innovate go to the ﬁrm that innovates.
When information is shared, the competitive threat is zero in both the
social optimum and in the cooperative equilibrium, since the aggregate
outcome is exactly the same whether one ﬁrm or both discover the new
technology. However the competitive threat is positive for the noncoopera-
tive equilibrium since an individual ﬁrm will always lose if it fails to dis-
cover technology when the other ﬁrm has done so. The only diﬀerence that
arises when information is not shared is that the competitive threat in the
cooperative equilibrium is then negative, since, by deﬁnition, industry
proﬁts are lower when both ﬁrms discover the technology than when only
o n ed o e ss o .
The general conclusions are that when both ﬁrms undertake R&D, then
compared to the social optimum, the cooperative equilibrium always un-
derinvests; R&D spending will be higher in the noncooperative equi-
librium than in the cooperative equilibrium; and R&D spending in the
noncooperative equilibrium may be higher or lower than in the social opti-
mum. It is therefore far from obvious that RJVs necessarily perform better
than the noncooperative equilibrium in terms of getting the levels of R&D
spending right. Where they may potentially prove beneﬁcial is in eliminat-
ing the needless duplication of R&D eﬀort.
10.3.5 Stage 2: RJV Membership
As noted previously, this is trivial. Since the tax rates set in stage 6 do
not depend on the RJV-membership decision, and since in a given environ-
ment ﬁrms are always better oﬀ cooperating than not cooperating, the
ﬁrms will always join an RJV if RJVs are allowed.
10.3.6 Stage 1: RJV Policy
The government now has to decide whether or not to allow ﬁrms to
form an RJV. We know that the information-sharing decision in stage 5
will be exactly the same whether ﬁrms act cooperatively or noncoopera-
tively. So, let













denote the level of welfare that will be achieved if, in stage 4, one lab
discovers the new technology and the other does not, allowing for the in-
formation sharing decision that will subsequently be made in stage 5.
Let pn
i, i  1, 2, denote the noncooperative equilibrium probabilities of
discovery by each of the two labs as determined in stages 3 and 4 of the
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i, i  1, 2, denote the corresponding probabilities in the co-
operative (RJV) equilibrium. Let Wn and Wc denote the expected level of
social welfare in the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria, respec-
tively. Then the formula,
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gives the expected level of social welfare in the equilibrium of type t.
To complete our analysis of the model, we have undertaken a numerical
comparison of both the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria and
their associated levels of expected welfare. What we have done is as fol-
l o w s .W eh a v es e ta  c  4,21 and we have chosen values for the parameter
 and for a parameter ,0

1, which determines the magnitude of
the parameter in relation to its upper bound  (d). Initially we have chosen
values 0.2 and 0. 5. For each of the values of d given in table 10.1
and for the value of  
 (d), we have solved for the following: (1) the
probability of discovery per ﬁrm in the social optimum, which we denote
by p ˆi, i  1, 2 (in doing this calculation, we take into account the fact that
in the social optimum there would be full information sharing); and (2)
the equilibrium levels of R&D spending in both the cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria, which we denote by pC
i , pN
i , i  1, 2, respectively (in
doing these calculations, we take into account the fact that information
will be shared if ' ˘(d) and will not be shared otherwise).
We use the convention that if one of the ﬁrms does not undertake R&D
it is always the second. We have then computed the expected levels of
welfare in the social optimum and in both the cooperative and noncooper-
ative equilibria. By deﬁnition, expected welfare in each of the two equilib-
ria is less than the expected welfare in the social optimum. We can there-
fore calculate the percentage welfare loss in each of the two equilibria.
These are denoted by LC and LN for the cooperative and noncooperative
equilibrium, respectively. For the case where ' ˘(d), and so information
is fully shared in both the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria, ﬁrms
are making the socially optimal information-sharing decision, and so this
welfare loss arises solely because ﬁrms are making the wrong R&D deci-
sions. However, when  ˘(d) ﬁrms are, in addition, making the wrong
information-sharing decision. We then calculate the hypothetical level of
welfare that would have arisen for the given equilibrium levels of R&D
spending, but assume now that information is fully shared. Using this, it
is possible to decompose the overall welfare losses into welfare losses LC
R
21. Higher values of this parameter resulted in outcomes where ﬁrms were innovating
almost surely most of the time, while lower values of this parameter produced very low R&D
probabilities. As we will see, this parameter produces quite a wide range of R&D probabili-
ties as other parameters varied.
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R that arise in each of the two equilibria because of the wrong
R&D decisions, and welfare losses LC
I and LN
I that arise because the wrong
information-sharing decision has been made.
Table 10.2 presents the calculations for three values of d  1, 2.142,
3.585 (no extra insights are obtained by including the calculations for the
other two values of d). It should be borne in mind that the associated
values of  ˘ are 1, 0.704, and 0.443, respectively. So, with 0.5 informa-
tion will be shared for the ﬁrst two values of d, but not for the third.
A number of points emerge from this table. First, when damage is low,
so too are taxes. The returns to R&D in terms of either welfare or proﬁts
are high, and this causes ﬁrms to undertake a lot of R&D with a high
probability of discovery. But this also means that the probability of dupli-
cation is also high. For this reason, in both the social optimum and the
cooperative equilibrium, it pays to shut a lab. However, in the noncoopera-
tive equilibrium both labs operate, giving rise to signiﬁcant losses from
excessive duplication. Since, when damage is low information is always
shared, the only welfare losses arise from getting R&D decisions wrong,
and the cooperative equilibrium performs signiﬁcantly better than the
noncooperative equilibrium.
Second, when damage is somewhat higher, so too are taxes and the re-
turns to R&D in terms of both welfare and proﬁts are lower. The risk of
duplication is now lower, and it turns out that in both the social optimum
and the cooperative equilibrium both labs are kept open. Compared to the
social optimum, the cooperative equilibrium underinvests in R&D and
the noncooperative equilibrium overinvests. The losses are of almost equal
magnitude. Once again information is fully shared, so the R&D losses are
the only ones that matter.
Table 10.2 Comparison of Cooperative and Noncooperative Equilibria to
Social Optimum
0.2, 0.5
d 1 2.142 3.585
p ˆ 1 0.99 0.659 0.532
p ˆ 2 0 0.659 0.532
pC
1 0.982 0.551 0.354
pC
2 0 0.551 0.354
LC 0.03 0.67 4.47
LC
R 0.03 0.67 1.55
LC
1 0 0 2.91
pN
1  pN
1 0.899 0.762 0.57
LN 1.98 0.69 3.2
LN
R 1.98 0.69 0.07
LN
1 0 0 3.12
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R&D fall further, so further reducing the risk of needless duplication.
Both labs are therefore always used. The noncooperative equilibrium over-
invests and the cooperative equilibrium underinvests, but now the loss
from underinvestment is considerably greater than the loss from overin-
vestment, and in terms of R&D decision making the noncooperative equi-
librium now scores better than the cooperative equilibrium. However, with
this level of damage, taxes fall with  , which, ceteris paribus, raises the
proﬁts from not sharing information. Thus, in this case, information will
not be shared, but, since the probability that just one ﬁrm will discover
the technology is higher in the noncooperative equilibrium than in the
cooperative equilibrium, the welfare loss from getting the information-
sharing decision wrong is higher in the noncooperative equilibrium than
in the cooperative equilibrium. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence is rather small
and is dominated by the better performance of the noncooperative equilib-
rium in terms of R&D decision making. Thus the overall conclusion from
table 10.2 is that RJVs outperform noncooperative equilibria when dam-
age is low, but that this is reversed when the damage is high.
Appendix tables 10A.6–10A.8 report the results of similar exercises for
various parameter values. Thus in table 10A.6, we report the outcomes
when there is more rapid diminishing to returns to R&D and 0.5.
Now both labs are always kept open. Nevertheless, the conclusions of table
10.2 are broadly conﬁrmed—RJVs do better when damage is small be-
cause overinvestment in the noncooperative equilibrium dominates the un-
derinvestment of the cooperative equilibrium. However, the positions are
reversed as damage increases.
Appendix table 10A.7 reports the outcomes when 0.2, but now 
is raised to 0.75. Now information is not shared when damage takes its
intermediate value, and in this case the information-sharing loss from the
RJV exceeds that in the noncooperative equilibrium. Other than that, the
results broadly conﬁrm the ﬁndings of table 10.2.
Finally, appendix table 10A.8 reports the outcomes when 0.2, but
now 0.25. Now information is always shared and both labs are always
kept open. The performance of the RJV gets steadily worse as damage
increases and so too does the extent of underinvestment, whereas the per-
formance of the noncooperative equilibrium steadily improves as the ex-
tent of overinvestment is reduced.
10.4 Conclusion
We have examined the performance of environmental RJVs using a
model in which information sharing is endogenous, ﬁrms can choose to
license their technology, and the number of labs that are operated is endog-
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information-sharing decisions; (2) the failure to operate the right number
of labs, leading to excessive duplication of eﬀort; and (3) getting the R&D
decisions wrong through under- or overinvestment. We have shown that
an analysis of this issue requires a careful discussion of the informational
and commitment powers of the government in setting its environmental
policy.
In the context of a very simple model in which there is very limited
commitment, we have shown the following. First, as in Ulph and Katsou-
lacos (1998), RJVs will share information under precisely the same circum-
stances as in the noncooperative equilibrium. Second, information sharing
is more likely when damage and hence taxes are low. Third, when damage
is low, RJVs perform better in R&D decision making than does the nonco-
operative equilibrium for two reasons: since the returns to R&D are high
they are more likely to avoid the risk of needless duplication and the loss
from underinvestment by the RJV is smaller than the loss from overinvest-
ment in the noncooperative equilibrium. Fourth, as damage rises, the un-
derinvestment by the RJV increases and the overinvestment in the nonco-
operative equilibrium falls. A tentative conclusion is that RJVs do better
than noncooperative arrangements when environmental damage is low,
but worse when environmental damage is high.
Appendix
Table 10A.1 Computed Values of Tax Rate, Proﬁts, and Welfare
d  1,   ¯  1,   ˜  1.2,  ˜  1
  t10 10 W10
0 25 1,250 2,500
0.1 27.4 1,130.1 2,384.9
0.2 29.6 1,027.4 2,291.5
0.3 31.4 950.0 2,220.8
0.4 32.8 902.2 2,172.7
0.5 33.8 884.3 2,145.3
0.6 34.3 893.8 2,136.1
0.7 34.5 926.3 2,142.1
0.8 34.3 976.7 2,160.3
0.9 34.0 1,039.8 2,187.9
1 33.3 1,111.1 2,222.2
Note: Information shared is ∀ ,0' '  ¯ ⇒  ˘  1.
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d  3.585,   ¯  0.3,   ˜  0.194,  ˜  0.65
  t10 10 W10
0 67.3 237.8 1,090.5
0.03 67.0 229.3 1,067.7
0.06 67.0 225.8 1,050.2
0.09 66.3 227.2 1,037.7
0.12 65.9 233.2 1,030.1
0.15 65.4 243.6 1,027.1
0.18 64.9 258.2 1,028.2
0.21 64.4 276.6 1,033.3
0.24 63.8 298.5 1,042.0
0.27 63.2 323.6 1,054.0
0.3 62.5 351.6 1,069.0
Note: By interpolation,   ˘  0.133 ⇒  ˘  0.443.
Table 10A.3 Computed Values of Tax Rate, Proﬁts, and Welfare
d  2.142,   ¯  0.5,   ˜  0.365,  ˜  0.73
  t10 10 W10
0 52.3 506.5 1,591.3
0.05 52.5 476.9 1,542.7
0.1 52.7 457.4 1,505.0
0.15 52.7 448.1 1,477.8
0.2 52.6 448.8 1,460.4
0.25 52.5 459.0 1,452.2
0.3 52.2 478.1 1,452.2
0.35 51.8 505.3 1,459.7
0.4 51.3 539.5 1,473.8
0.45 50.7 579.7 1,493.5
0.5 50.0 625.1 1,518.1
Note: By interpolation,   ˘  0.352 ⇒  ˘  0.704.
Table 10A.2 Computed Values of Tax Rate, Proﬁts, and Welfare
d  1.497,   ¯  0.7,   ˜  0.6,  ˜  0.86
  t10 10 W10
0 39.9 801.9 2,002.4
0.07 41.0 740.9 1,926.4
0.14 41.9 694.1 1,866.4
0.21 42.6 663.3 1,822.3
0.28 43.0 649.1 1,793.1
0.35 43.3 651.4 1,777.8
0.42 43.3 668.8 1,774.9
0.49 43.1 699.5 1,782.7
0.56 42.8 741.6 1,999.7
0.63 42.3 792.7 1,824.1
0.7 41.7 850.7 1,854.6
Note: By interpolation,   ˘  0.641 ⇒  ˘  0.916.Table 10A.7 Comparison of Cooperative and Noncooperative Equilibria to
Social Optimum
0.2, 0.75
d 1 2.142 3.585
p ˆ1 0.996 0.708 0.595
p ˆ2 0 0.708 0.595
pC
1 0.99 0.593 0.425
pC
2 0 0.593 0.425
LC 0.04 5.11 4.5
LC
R 0.04 0.99 1.84
LC
I 0 4.18 2.66
pN
1  pN
2 0.942 0.834 0.658
LN 3.19 3.78 2.73
LN
R 3.19 1.39 0.28
LN
I 0 2.39 2.44
Table 10A.6 Comparison of Cooperative and Noncooperative Equilibria to
Social Optimum
0.5, 0.5
d 1 2.142 3.585
p ˆ1 0.609 0.47 0.34
p ˆ2 0.609 0.47 0.34
pC
1 0.573 0.358 0.197
pC
2 0.573 0.358 0.197
LC 0.13 1.07 3.73
LC
R 0.13 1.07 1.61
LC
I 0 0 2.11
pN
1  pN
2 0.665 0.48 0.31
LN 0.33 0.0 2.93
LN
R 0.33 0.0 0.07
LN
I 0 0 2.85
Table 10A.5 Computed Values of Tax Rate, Proﬁts, and Welfare
d  10.405,   ¯  0.1,   ˜  0.06,  ˜  0.6
  t10 10 W10
0 86.8 38.4 438.4
0.01 86.5 38.1 434.8
0.02 86.2 38.7 432.1
0.03 85.9 40.0 430.1
0.04 85.5 42.1 429.0
0.05 85.2 44.9 428.6
0.06 84.8 48.4 428.9
0.07 84.5 52.7 430.0
0.08 84.1 57.6 431.8
0.09 83.7 63.2 434.2
0.1 83.3 69.4 437.3
Note: By interpolation,   ˘  0.015 ⇒  ˘  0.15.References
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Comment Jerome Rothenberg
The authors examine the performance of environmental RJVs in an ex-
tremely rich analytical context, drawing together several important is-
sues—environmental damage, government taxes, industry competitive-
ness, information sharing, and government policy toward cooperative
research and development (R&D) behavior of environmental, growth, and
regulatory economics. They do this with clarity and skill. Theirs is a very
illuminating treatment.
They are rewarded with most interesting results. It is important that in
their complex set of relationships there is no general answer to the question
of whether environmental policy abets or hinders the performance of
RJVs. What transpires is that for some combinations of parameter values
the eﬀort is positive, for others negative. But the results have intuitive
thrust. Thus, we have an opportunity to see how the diﬀe r e n tp o r t i o n so f
the model generate trade-oﬀs and how these trade-oﬀs are mediated by
other portions of the model. The interconnectedness of parts becomes, in
eﬀect, the centerpiece of the exercise. And the reader’s exercise of intuition
in the system is most useful for understanding what such a system is really
like. In particular, the disparate forces acting on social welfare become
appreciated more fully.
The overall system is quite complex due to the variety of market failures
that are embedded, and against which the performance of environmental
policy and RJVs is evaluated. To render such a system reasonably trac-
table, a number of stringently simplifying assumptions are adopted. These
make it possible to have enough transparency to understand intuitively the
great variety of complex outcome scenarios. Greater complexity would
risk this transparency, but I should like to venture to ruminate about some
analytic avenues that have been precluded that would have permitted the
inclusion of what I believe to be important dimensions of the real world.
My remaining comments will sketch these dimensions and preliminary ru-
diments of how they might be incorporated in the present model.
The areas I will deal with are (1) the dimensionality of R&D, (2) the
multiperiod gestation of R&D eﬀects, and (3) various signiﬁcant initial
and achieved diﬀerences among ﬁrms.
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Jerome Rothenberg is professor emeritus of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.The Dimensionality of R&D
Level and “Angle”
The paper treats all R&D payoﬀs as improved emissions controls that
are perfect substitutes for one another. Firms can engage in diﬀerent levels
of R&D spending, but there are only two kinds of payoﬀs: success or
failure. The spending levels inﬂuence only the probability of success, but
not its degree or character. All successes result from the same sort of new
information and are perfect substitutes for one another.
An important fact about the real world is that in the face of the uncer-
tainty represented by the problem of changing current technology so as to
accomplish particular new goals, diﬀerent researchers and research organ-
izations will often try diﬀerent approaches to the problem (the history of
science is replete with this phenomenon). Moreover, especially where com-
petitive market-oriented eﬀorts are involved, these diﬀerent routes will be
deliberately kept secret from one another, notably in prepatent stages. So
they are likely to have diﬀerent kinds of failures and successes. The break-
throughs will generally be diﬀerent. The resulting emissions improvements
will therefore not usually be perfect substitutes for one another, either in
amount or in kind. They will be variously imperfect substitutes. Over any
one stretch of multiﬁrm R&D behavior, there is likely to be a spectrum of
emissions improvements—although all will be comparable in terms of the
achieved degree of emissions decrease per unit of market product.
To facilitate the analysis, I propose to simplify this situation drastically.
I suppose that at any point in time there exists a consensus about the
identity of the most conventional breakthrough route. Let this route be the
point of departure for classifying all other possible kinds of breakthrough.
The others are less obvious, riskier, and more controversial, both with re-
gard to the probability of any success and the probability distribution of
extent of possible successes. Assume, then, that the most conventional,
least controversial direction represents the R&D route with given mean
and least variance of net gains (value of gross gains less cost of the R&D
eﬀort). Assume also that the other routes can be accorded at least an ap-
proximate net gain mean and variance, both mean and variance increasing
with degree of unconventionality.
Let each R&D project be deﬁned in the two dimensions of size—level
of spending, r, and degree of unconventionality, which I call the research
angle, :
(1) Rr ii i = (, ) , 
where (ri,i) deﬁnes a probability distribution of emissions-decrease out-
comes from zero upward.
At any given time there exists the scientiﬁc know-how for formulating
340 Yannis Katsoulacos, Alistair Ulph, and David Ulphn  1d i ﬀerent research directions, forming a boundary set.1 Each (rx,x)
deﬁnes a diﬀerent probability distribution of emissions decreases with the
property that both mean, M, and variance, 2
, of outcome increase
with research angle, the degree of unconventionality. These distributions
are not simply multiples of rx, since the diﬀerent research angles are likely
to have diﬀerent scale economies.
Thus, associated with each choice of (r,) is a stochastic outcome, e,
reﬂecting the particular distribution relevant to that project—where e is
the emissions decrease achieved by that project. The larger x, the greater
is the probability that actual e will be zero, but also the greater is the
expected value of gain. For the analysis of ﬁrm decision making, these
physical outcomes can be used both where purely regulatory goals have to
be met—in terms of minimizing research and penalty costs for achieving
regulatory standards—and where emissions decreases have unit monetary
value—in terms of maximizing net ﬁnancial gains from research.
In the present context, we apply this two-dimensional R&D approach
by supposing that there are several (m) ﬁrms in this industry and that they
have diﬀerent risk preferences in the relevant period. Then they will choose
diﬀerent (rx,x), with both the level and angle diﬀerent. As a result, these
projects, (r1,1), (r2,x) ,...,( rm,x), will result in diﬀerent levels of
achieved emissions decreases. Moreover, since R&D outcomes are all sto-
chastic, even an identical set of projects by all ﬁrms would result, in the
absence of information sharing, in a particular period of real time, in
diﬀerent achieved degrees of emissions decreases.
Substitutability of R&D Outcomes
Increasing the dimensionality of R&D has important implications for
the nature of the substitutability of R&D outcomes. R&D always leads to
stochastic outcomes. But these are inﬂuenced by the choice of both r and
—r as a scale factor and  as the particular direction and strategy by
which it is hoped that research breakthroughs occur. Choice of  is the
choice of the channel by which new knowledge is sought. In eﬀect, it is
the kinds of research issues that it is hoped will prove productive. Two
ﬁrms selecting the same ,h o w e v e rd i ﬀerent their research scales (r1,r2),
will be on the same route, manipulating and discovering new knowledge
of the same sort. Whatever research results transpire will be quite simi-
lar—even though the ﬁrm with smaller scale is not likely to have gone as
far in discovery. Thus, the eﬀorts of the smaller research project will carry
little of interest to the larger project; the interest of the smaller in the larger
will be primarily to ﬁnd out how much further one can probably get to by
continuing in the same direction. Thus, their results are highly substitu-
1. The set of directions that, for each variance, has the highest mean R&D outcome. Given
the heterogeneous risk preferences, this represents the only set of inherently nondominated
directions.
Environmental Policy and Performance of Environmental RJVs 341tive—each having little to learn from the other in that part of their quest
with which both have experience.
Say, instead, that the two ﬁrms have chosen the same r and very diﬀerent
,( 1,2). Now they are setting out on very diﬀerent tasks, dealing with
diﬀerent analytical issues and diﬀerent strategies—although both aimed
at the same ﬁnal achievements, new technology for emissions reductions.
Whatever results they stochastically achieve, they will have come by via
diﬀerent kinds of new knowledge. As when viewing statuary, you learn
more about a statue by walking around it than by staring at it from a single
perspective. Two R&D ventures with these diﬀerent (1,2) will teach a lot
more about the natural systems involved than two R&D ventures with
the same , 1  2. The former outcomes will not be substitutive, but
complementary.
Generalizing, then, ﬁrms can inﬂuence the degree of substitutability or
complementarity of their R&D results with those of other ﬁrms by their
choice of similar or diﬀerent relative to the others. Moreover, the degrees,
as well as the sign, of outcome relatedness can vary substantially depend-
ing on the speciﬁc diﬀerences in chosen research direction.
We discuss later why degree and sign of relatedness are quite important
for the issues taken up in this paper—notably, sharing of information and/
or coordinating research eﬀorts across ﬁrms.
R&D as a Multiperiod Process
The second major issue concerns the temporal dynamics of R&D. A
ﬁrm’s R&D commitment does not involve a single time-span eﬀort after
which the R&D is either attained or fails. The character of an R&D eﬀort
is often set by the nature of environmental regulation. Often the regulation
speciﬁes “ultimate” emissions control goals not presently attainable, along
with a timetable of steps for gradually meeting them. Experience leads to
the expectation that it will take a number of breakthroughs, not one, to
achieve the goals. A particular R&D strategy () is a game plan for passing
through a sequence of research eﬀorts to reach the ultimate goals. Each
R&D stage is expected to advance the search, but not end it.
Accordingly, R&D projects have intermediate eﬀects—new understand-
ing about technological processes and newly revised prospects for success.
Future success depends on this new information and these successes so
far. Choice of  at the outset is thus a strategy for generating an intermedi-
ate new understanding that will be productive for additional gains in the
further future. Moreover, this further progress may depend on the willing-
ness to combine this new information with that of intermediate new infor-
mation generated by R&D in other ﬁrms. The potential research produc-
tivity of such combining depends on the degree of complementarity of
such new intermediate understanding. R&D projects using nearly similar
 will produce new information that is very much alike, and therefore not
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exploring quite diﬀerent aspects of the problem, are likely to generate in-
termediate results that are not only diﬀerent but mutually enlightening,
and thus with a high potential for productivity in combined eﬀorts.
Thus, the impetus for either sharing research results along the way, or
actually combining future eﬀorts jointly, is inﬂuenced importantly by the
choice of  at the outset of the R&D commitment. The key is complemen-
tarity of results—that is, nonsubstitutability. Indeed, degree of comple-
mentarity is appropriately deﬁned in terms of extent of potential fruitful-
ness of combined, or shared, R&D eﬀorts. Complementarity now makes
future joint projects, or sharing of results (leasing), potentially attractive.
Therefore, the incentives for information transfer and/or RJV, and thus
for an optimal new technology transfer, are directly related to the deliber-
ate strategic choice of , not merely of r. This relevance of  is expressly
in the context of intertemporal, multiperiod innovation strategy.
The degree of interﬁrm informedness is important in this. Two extreme
cases can be distinguished. In the ﬁrst, no ﬁrm knows the  choice, and
intermediate outcomes, of any other ﬁrm. Generally, each will know about
the others only after new processes have been patented. This is plausible.
The relevant information is highly proprietary, and ﬁrms strive to keep it
secret. At the other extreme, every ﬁrm knows the  choices and interme-
diate results of all the others. The ﬁrst case seems a much closer approxi-
mation to the truth. In such a situation, period-by-period R&D behavior
by itself will have an important element of strategy about the attractions
of future jointness in continuing eﬀorts. As an example, the persistent
choice of  near 0 (a low-risk strategy) represents playing it safe. Such a
ﬁrm will not be signaling a desire to initiate joint eﬀorts with the other
ﬁrms having very diﬀerent  from theirs. It might subsequently be pas-
sively receptive to sharing or coordination with signiﬁcantly nonconsen-
sual eﬀorts diﬀering from its own markedly, but its low-risk propensities
suggest that this would represent a gambling endeavor foreign to those
propensities. On the other hand, a ﬁrm choosing a highly nonconsensual
direction would probably be risk-preferring. It is likely to be signaling will-
ingness both to share information—or even more, to collaborate with
other ﬁrms selecting high but very diﬀerent values of —and also to ac-
cept such initiatives from other risk-preferring ﬁrms.
The impact of this strategic variable on leasing or RJV requires looking
more richly at the R&D situation. In particular, we must know something
about the initial similarities or diﬀerences between the two ﬁrms in their
emissions rates per unit output.
Case 1. The two ﬁrms (F1 and F2) begin with very diﬀerent emissions
rates, but choose the same . The ﬁrm with less prior R&D success (say
F2) could gain here from a catch-up strategy by sharing F1’s information.
But F1 would gain little from such sharing, since F2 has little of interest
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maximizing terms.
Case 2. The initial diﬀerence in emissions rates for F1 and F2 is small, but
the diﬀerence of the chosen  is large. The big strategy diﬀerence here
suggests highly complementary R&D output. On the basis of pre-R&D
technology, this complementarity would not make sharing or coordination
attractive to either ﬁrm at the outset of R&D. But it makes future inter-
change probable. Since R&D is a multistage process, the large diﬀerence
in  suggests that ﬁrst-stage outcomes will be quite diﬀerent for the two
ﬁrms. In such a situation, their complementarity will be favorable for inter-
change.
The ﬁrst two cases focus on ﬁrm diﬀerences in  and emissions rates. But
the absolute strategy direction of each ﬁrm and the size of ﬁrst-stage R&D
outcomes matter as well.
Case 3. F1 has a high , that is, is highly unconventional. It represents a
high-risk strategy, carrying possibilities of large gains. Since much lower 
strategies are likely to be adopted by other ﬁrms, F1 will have R&D out-
comes that are highly complementary with those of many other ﬁrms. If
its ﬁrst-stage successes are meager, it will be anxious to share with more
successful ﬁrms; but such interchange may well have little attraction for
those ﬁrms. On the other hand, if it has important ﬁrst-stage successes, its
unique types of new information will be very attractive to other ﬁrms,
successful or not. Moreover, the prospect of really major success from
interchange with other complementary ﬁrms will make this ﬁrm seek shar-
ing. So high risk taking may well signal a predisposition to share infor-
mation.
Case 4. F1 and F2 adopt strategies that make their R&D results suﬃ-
ciently complementary. If their R&D outcomes in the ﬁrst stage are poor,
they are likely to have little interest in sharing. Similarly, if both have
nearly equal success in the ﬁrst stage, their incentive to share is not likely
to be great. But a large disparity in successful outcomes may well make
the less-successful ﬁrm eager to share. If the strategy of F1, the less-
successful ﬁrm, is one of high risk, the successes may well induce F2, the
more-successful ﬁrm, to share, on the chance that their complementarity,
fed by the moderate success of F1, could generate a large overall success
due to the large stakes being pursued by F2.
These speculations suggest that in a multistage conception of the R&D
process, initial and midcourse behavior depends on stochastic outcomes
during the process, in the context of the strategic directions chosen by the
various ﬁrms involved.
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Real-world ﬁrms have diﬀerences that are important to the issues dealt
with in the paper. We have already suggested that diﬀerences in risk prefer-
ences will lead them to choose diﬀerently with respect to R&D, not only
in whether or not they engage in R&D, individually or cooperatively, but
also in how they invest in R&D, with regard to both level and angle. These
diﬀerences create distinctive trajectories over time. Indeed, because the
R&D process is inherently stochastic, they are likely to have diﬀerent tem-
poral trajectories even if they make identical choices at each time, al-
though these diﬀerences will be smaller and less systematic than due to
the former source.
But there are other systematic sources of diﬀerence as well: initial condi-
tions. At any moment of time, ﬁrms in the same industry will generate
diﬀerent rates of emissions per unit of output due to historical diﬀerences
in technology, in capital stock, in capital-output ratios, and in diﬀerent
vintages. Moreover, these emissions generate diﬀerent unit damages. They
have diﬀerent locations, and these inﬂuence the size of damages because
of diﬀerences in potential victim populations, density, and the assimilative
capacity of the relevant local environments.
If environmental policy is used to maximize social welfare, then (1) ﬁrms
with equal social-damage functions will be taxed (or otherwise regulated)
to generate the same marginal trade-oﬀ between environmental impair-
ment and net economic gain from market activities, and (2) ﬁrms with
diﬀerent social-damage functions will be taxed (or otherwise regulated) for
diﬀerent environmental and market trade-oﬀs. In the presence of the two
kinds of ﬁrm diﬀerences mentioned, both cases lead to diﬀerent ﬁrms fac-
ing diﬀerent required environmental performance for optimal perfor-
mance compliance. If ﬁrms with similar damage functions are faced with
regulation with the same ﬁnal emissions-rate goal, then some will start
with less far to go and others with farther to go to reach it. For some,
adjustment to compliance will be easier, for others harder. Similarly, ﬁrms
with diﬀerent damage functions will face diﬀerent degrees of diﬃculty in
ultimate compliance.
These diﬀerences are pervasive in the real world and important. Indeed,
the popularity of emissions trading in environmental policy is an explicit
assertion of the importance of such interﬁrm diﬀerences; in their absence
the policy would be meaningless.
The paper being reviewed minimizes such diﬀerences for purposes of
tractability, but elaborations of such an analysis to bring the examination
closer to the real world seem to warrant a compact treatment of these dif-
ferences. Such a treatment is especially compatible with a multiperiod con-
ception of R&D behavior.
In any stage of preparing for ultimate compliance, therefore, ﬁrms will
confront one another with diﬀerent requirements and opportunities, stem-
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ential progress they have already made up to the present stage (and by
diﬀerent routes) via their R&D strategies and stochastic outcomes. This
c o m p l e xo fd i ﬀerences certainly aﬀects what decisions they will make
about the next-stage strategies and actions. Symmetry will be a less rele-
vant analytical predictor here, and bargaining power will diﬀer from ﬁrm
to ﬁrm. In such a context, leasing and trading schemes may become more
important and RJVs less so, because the former have a more impersonal
way of monetizing diﬀerences, while the latter must achieve monetization
of these diﬀerences by personal negotiation and are embedded in the very
structure of the more integral cooperation.
Competition and Competitive Advantage
The degree of competitiveness in an industry, as inﬂuence on and inﬂu-
enced by the various factors concerning R&D, is treated as having an in-
ﬂuence on social welfare. It would be useful to bring together the impacts
on the meaning and measure of competitive market advantage of the kinds
of modiﬁcations I have been discussing here.
Given the multiperiod R&D framework, let us assume that full gesta-
tion to ultimate compliance from the outset involves a long time period.
Then the regulator is likely to set stage-by-stage deadlines for achieving
interim standards. If so, most R&D improvements would be implemented
nearly as soon as they emerge, instead of being saved up until they could
lend their insights and R&D experience to ﬁnd ultimate R&D success on
the most eﬃcient path fed by trial and error. Likewise, new technology
leased from others would be implemented steadily as it is acquired, with
acquisition not awaiting the ﬁnal perfection of outcomes in the particular
direction of change.
Then the cost of acquiring these improvements would be annualized
into ﬁrms’ operating costs, and the resulting operating cost structures
would aﬀect the competitiveness of the various ﬁrms. Our discussion lends
itself to the strong expectation that ﬁrms will diﬀer substantially in these
new technology costs, deriving from diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ initial conditions,
diﬀerential regulatory treatment, and diﬀerential R&D strategy and suc-
cess. So environmental policy, in such a context, can lead to nontrivial
changes in interﬁrm market power, with possibly further inﬂuence on mar-
ket structure.
How these changes will play out against the outcomes in other dimen-
sions of the complex system we have been discussing is far more likely to
evade precise delineation than in our authors’ worthy, far tidier model. But
in what must be at least a highly speculative judgment, I must concur with
the authors that the most useful attitude to adopt at the present about
RJVs is skepticism.
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